NUKS-USA Omma'08

Interview with Dr. Michael Herb

Department of Political Sciences

Georgia State University

Section I: Getting involved with Kuwait

1. How did you first encounter Kuwait?

I first visited Kuwait in 1993: I was a graduate student at the University of California at Los Angeles. I received a grant from the US Department of Education to do dissertation research in Kuwait, and I spent the academic year at the department of Political Science at Kuwait University. The chair of the department at the time, Saif Abbas, gave me a warm welcome.

2. What interested you most in the State of Kuwait?

I was trying to settle on a dissertation topic in the period following the liberation of Kuwait, and so Kuwait (and the Gulf more generally) caught my interest. I came to Kuwait to do my dissertation research in part because it is an easier place to do research than the rest of the Gulf, especially at that time.

While my dissertation dealt with the issue of the survival of monarchies and the role of the ruling families, in recent years I have been interested in the question of parliaments in the Gulf. Kuwait has the most effective parliament, so I have been interested in understanding how it works and how its role is likely to change.

3. How does your work (research and study) approach Kuwait?

I do not have any particular agenda, apart from a general conviction that democracy is usually the best form of government. But even on that point I am not an extremist: sometimes a rapid transition to democracy causes more problems than it solves. More generally, my interest in Kuwait is, as they say, largely academic: it is a very unusual political system, and I enjoy studying it to understand how it works, and how it is different from other political systems around the world.

4. How would rank Kuwait among Middle Eastern countries in terms of democracy, freedoms, political stability, economical development and overall conditions?

In terms of democracy Kuwait ranks well. I use the standard definition of democracy used by political scientists, in which a country is democratic if both the legislative and executive branches of government are elected in reasonably free and fair elections. By this measure, Israel and Turkey are democracies, though like many democracies they have problems with their treatment of minorities (the Arabs in Israel, the Kurds in Iraq). Among Arab countries, Iraq and Lebanon are at least partly democratic, though they suffer from severe internal conflicts and foreign interference. In Kuwait the legislative branch of government is elected in reasonably free and fair elections, but the prime minister and the ministers are selected by members of ruling family. But the parliament also has some say in who is selected to hold ministerial portfolios because the emir and prime minister do not want to select ministers who will run into trouble with the parliament. Thus there are substantial elements of democracy in Kuwait, though overall the country is not a full democracy. Nonetheless it is the Arab country that is closest to democracy while avoiding the sorts of problems seen in Lebanon and Iraq.

Kuwait's political system sometimes does not look stable, in comparison to the political systems of other Arab countries. Certainly there are more government changes in Kuwait than in other Arab countries. But these other Arab countries usually achieve their stability through refusing to allow the people to participate in the government. In Kuwait, by contrast, elections matter and so too does the parliament, and this leads to a much more interesting political system with more elections and changes of government. It has also led to a gradual increase in the power of the parliament and a relative decrease in the power of the ruling family. But in some ways this is actually an indication of the strength and stability of the political system in Kuwait: it can adjust to changes, rather than remaining frozen in place like many other Arab authoritarian regimes.

Kuwait's economy, of course, has its problems – or, specifically, the non-oil private sector has problems. In comparison to other Gulf countries, Kuwait has many fewer tourists, much less foreign direct investment, and a smaller reexport trade. I agree with the merchants who argue that this is largely because most Kuwaiti voters work in government jobs and thus ultimately rely on oil revenue for their income. As a result the majlis al-umma tends to ignore the concerns of the private sector while focusing on issues like the 50 dinar increase in salaries and cancelling debts. In the UAE and Qatar, by contrast, citizens have little voice in politics and the government relentlessly promotes the private sector. But this has costs for citizens: tourism often conflicts with the values of Gulf citizens, and the population imbalance in the UAE and Qatar is very severe. I do not think that Kuwaitis are willing to pay these costs, and so I think that Kuwait's private sector will continue to lag behind those of most other Gulf states.

Section II: The Data-Base

1. What is “Kuwait Politics Data-Base”?

The reason I started to assemble my database on Kuwaiti politics was that it was hard to answer a simple question about Kuwaiti politics: who won the elections? In most countries, parties compete in the elections and it is easy to determine who won by simply counting the candidates from each party who won seats. In Kuwait, however, the official election returns give only a name, a district, and the number of votes. Of course, some candidates are Muslim Brothers, some are liberals, some are salafi, some are tribal, some are Shi'i, and so forth. But that information is scattered among a large number of different sources (books, newspapers, Web sites, etc) and I had a great deal of difficulty in keeping track of who belonged to each bloc, sect or tribe. So I started keeping track of it in a database. Then I decided that I would put it on the Internet, thinking that others might also find the information useful. I originally thought that it would be useful mostly to foreign researchers who also had problems keeping track of who is who in Kuwaiti politics, but then I realized that this can be a challenge for Kuwaitis as well.

2. What can one conclude about Kuwaiti politics after exploring your database?

For myself, I am interested in relations between the parliament, the ruling family, and the cabinet, and how that is changing over time. As a political scientist, when I write something about Kuwaiti politics (or politics in other countries) I like to have good evidence to back up my assertions, and the database is a useful source of information on things like election results, interpellations, and so forth. But other people, especially Kuwaitis, use the database for other purposes, and in that sense it is just raw data: people can use it for whatever purpose they wish. The conclusions that they draw vary according to their interests.

I do think that the high level of interest that Kuwaitis have in elections says a lot about just how important elections are in Kuwait, especially compared to many other Arab countries.

3. What the common thread/s in Kuwait’s political history?

In terms of the database, it is interesting to see how elections have broadened the political elite in Kuwait. Back in the 1930s and even for the 1961 election, the merchants dominated Kuwaiti politics, along with the ruling family. Elections have allowed Kuwaitis from other groups to have a major voice in Kuwaiti politics. In the UAE, for example, the absence of a parliament has meant that the ruling family and the merchants still dominate the political systems (especially, of course, the ruling families). Some tribal leaders also have a voice, but the majority of Emiratis, especially those from less privileged backgrounds, really do not have much voice in government. That is not true in Kuwait.

Section II: Elections

1. How do you view the current elections in Kuwait?

Mostly I am just very curious to see how the 5 district system affects the composition of parliament.

2. How does the redistribution of electoral districts from 25 to 5 affect the elections in Kuwait today?

I'll have a better answer to that question on May 18th. But so far it appears that it will make lists more important – and that means that it will make those who draw up the lists more powerful, and the process by which the lists are formed more important.

3. How do social biases & affiliations (sectarian, tribal…etc.) affect the democratic process?

People around the world tend to vote for candidates who come from their own religious group, ethnic group, social class, race, and so forth, so Kuwait is not different in that regard. What does make Kuwait somewhat different is the structure of the electoral system. In most countries, voters vote for parties, and these parties include a coalition of different groups. Thus, for example, in the United States the nature of the electoral system ensures that there are only two parties, and by necessity these parties include a wide variety of different ethnic, religious and ideological groups. In a parliamentary system, like Israel, voters can choose from among a wider range of parties, so one sees parties that appeal largely to a single group, such as Shas. In Kuwait, there are no parties and voters have a choice from among a large number of candidates. Not surprisingly, Kuwaiti voters, given the opportunity, tend to vote for candidates from their sect, tribe or family.

The events of the past two weeks have made it clear that the government cannot easily stop the tribes from holding tribal primaries. Given this, I think that they should be legalized and organized. It is hard to ensure that the primaries are fair when they are illegal. My own opinion is also that, if tribal primaries are legalized, women ought to be allowed to vote in them also.

4. Kuwait has a variety of political divisions (Islamic, liberal….etc). How do you view each in terms of ideology, organization, political maturity and future?

The Muslim Brothers are the best organized political group in Kuwait. Not only do the Muslim Brothers have an electoral organization, but they also display a good deal of "party discipline" in the parliament, in the sense that the deputies voted as a bloc on most issues. The combination makes them very effective.

The Kutla al-Amal al-Watani does not have a presence outside the parliament and its members voted less frequently as a bloc in the parliament, which weakened its effectiveness. If the candidates of the Tahaluf al-Watani al-Dimuqrati do well in the elections this will bring more organization to the "liberals" in the parliament. The bloc, however, would benefit from an ability to attract votes from outside the Sunni hadhar.

The Kutla al-Amal al-Shabi has a presence in parliament, but little in the way of an electoral organization. Some of its members may do well as independents in the upcoming elections, but in the long run the bloc will need to develop a presence outside of parliament. Without this group the Islamists will have little competition in the tribal districts, except from pro-government candidates. Of course the bloc has had a very difficult spring, with the departure of two of its three Shi'i members, demonstrating the difficulties of maintaining a Shi'i-Sunni bloc in parliament.

5. How would women’s participation affect the democratic process?

I think it is very good for candidates to have to stand up in front of groups of women voters and hear their concerns. Regardless of whether or not a woman or two wins on May 17th, the vast majority of the parliament will be male, but at least now they need to pay some attention to the issues that specifically affect women.

6. What do you anticipate the results of the current elections in Kuwait would be?

Pro-government candidates who do not win tribal primaries, or win a spot on a unified Shi'i list, are not likely to do well in these elections. A lot thus depends on the tribal primaries, and the results of these are not all yet in at the time of this interview. It does appear that two pro-government deputies in the 2006 parliament lost in the Rushayda primary in the fourth. The Islamists were said to have done well in the Ajman primary in the fifth.

The large number of candidates who have thus far registered will probably help the lists, since votes for independents will likely be divided up among a large number of candidates. Of course, some groups (such as the salafis) will endorse candidates outside their lists, and this will also be important, as it has been in previous elections. The fact that the Tahaluf did not run full lists in the first or third is a recognition that some votes will go to independents. Overall, however, independents who are not already well-established political figures will probably not fare well on May 17th.

7. How do you view Kuwait’s future as a democratic state?

Over time I think that the parliament will, step-by-step, gain an increasingly large role in determining who serves in cabinet posts. I would guess that within a decade or two the process will be far enough along that we could begin to call Kuwait a democracy. The ruling family will, however, keep the ministries of interior and defense for a good time to come, and I would expect to see a "commoner" prime minister well before a commoner minister of defense.